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Abstract—Supply chain security threats pose new challenges
to security risk modeling techniques for complex ICT systems
such as the IoT. With established techniques drawn from
attack trees and reliability analysis providing needed points
of reference, graph-based analysis can provide a framework
for considering the role of suppliers in such systems. We
present such a framework here while highlighting the need for
a component-centered model. Given resource limitations when
applying this model to existing systems, we study various classes
of uncertainties in model development, including structural
uncertainties and uncertainties in the magnitude of estimated
event probabilities. Using case studies, we find that structural
uncertainties constitute a greater challenge to model utility and
as such should receive particular attention. Best practices in the
face of these uncertainties are proposed.
Index Terms—Supply chain, Internet of things, information
technology, operational technology, risk assessment, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and communications technology (ICT) sys-
tems are becoming increasingly complex, consisting of vari-
ous different components connected together [1]. Often, these
components are manufactured, controlled, or operated by
different entities in different regions of the world. It is almost
impossible to have centralized control over all entities in
the supply chain. Therefore, in addition to the conventional
risks of system failures, there is another layer of risks
emanating from supply chain actors. With the proliferation
of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and networks, these risks
are further amplified due to an unregulated and extremely
heterogeneous ecosystem. Hence, it is becoming critical to
develop methodologies to measure and analyze these supply
chain risks. A more alarming alarming concern is that the IoT
systems directly interact with critical infrastructure systems
leading to the possibility of cascaded failures and other
disastrous consequences.
Supply chain risk analysis in IoT systems is a challenge
due to the lack of direct applicability of traditional method-
ologies in supply chain risk management [2]. This challenge
is primarily due to the structural complexity of the systems
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Fig. 1: A simple system graph depicting three components,
their suppliers, and dependencies between them.
and the various different uncertainties that impact the assess-
ment of systemic risk. Since fundamental design method-
ologies in technical industries rely heavily on modularity
and abstraction, black-box systems that are difficult, if not
impossible, to audit pose a constraint within which critical
infrastructure security must be pursued. Processes to verify
that components have been manufactured without hidden
security vulnerabilities may be strategically important; how-
ever, the evident specialization required to produce complex
ICT systems entails the need for a comparable specialization
to provide credible verification. In general, then, acquirers
or integrators of complex components must be prepared to
assess and manage risks associated with supplier trust [3].
This challenging task calls for ongoing development of risk
assessment methodologies and heuristics for evaluating the
trustworthiness of suppliers [4], [5].
When developing modeling practices suited to assessing
these risks, it is necessary to consider the operational con-
straints within which model development proceeds. Given
the uncertainties inevitably present in model development,
processes should be designed to prioritize the clarification of
uncertainties that pose the greatest threat to model utility. In
this paper we present a brief graph-based model suited for the
assessment of supply chain risks, and develop case studies
that illustrate the kinds of uncertainties that may impede the
application of the modeling process to a given system. We
then propose that structural uncertainties have the potential
to be more significant than uncertainties in the probabilities
of basic events. Similarly, among structural uncertainties,
those pertaining to higher level components are particularly
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critical. Accordingly, the principle is developed that supply
chain security risk assessment should prioritize the accurate
structural assessment of systems in order to improve the
reliability of risk modeling in practice.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section
II provides an overview of the system model, including
an explanation of the risk analysis enabled by the model.
Section III outlines two kinds of uncertainties that may affect
the utility of the model in practice. Section IV develops a
series of case studies based on these uncertainties, illustrat-
ing important aspects of model performance when subject
to uncertainty and pointing to priorities when seeking to
mitigate the effect of these uncertainties. In conclusion we
offer recommendations based on these case studies.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The model developed here can be introduced by a com-
parison with attack trees [6], [7]. An attack tree is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) based security analysis technique rely-
ing on the fact that security incident analysis is very similar
to classical reliability analysis [8]–[11]. In an attack tree,
nodes represent events or sub-goals that contribute to the
accomplishing of a central event or goal that is the desired
aim of the attack under analysis. Edges connect nodes so
that resulting paths from leaf nodes to the top event repre-
sent feasible, completed attacks. Given probabilities of these
events, it is possible to compute the likelihood of each path
and so consider optimal detection and mitigation choices.
While recent research has explored the automated construc-
tion of attack graphs on systems by interfacing network
scanning applications and databases of known vulnerabilities,
it remains the case that the most important elements in
attack graphs are essentially discovered through empirical
investigation and expert knowledge of a system [12], [13].
It is the discovery of the causal connection between one
event and another that forms the basis of the utility of an
attack graph. This discovery is a matter of empirical research,
whether formally conducted by researchers or informally
ascertained by observing real attacks.
When applying the technique of attack tree modeling to
the threat of supply chain attacks, it is apparent that the
risk assessment process is limited by the need for empirical
observation of supply chain attack events and how they are
causally related to known vulnerabilities. It seems unlikely,
however, that the threat of a supplier could be captured by
identifying a set of discrete attack events that the supplier
might initiate because the set has no clear principle of con-
struction. Suppliers have extensive discretion and, supposing
the ability to act covertly, it is not feasible to rely on a discrete
set of known attacks that a supplier might cause.
A second way in which supply chain attacks cannot be
easily added to existing attack tree techniques is that suppliers
have the potential to alter underlying system constraints. Tra-
ditional attackers work within the constraints of a system as it
is deployed, finding unanticipated or vulnerable pathways to
cause events that work to their advantage. Yet a supplier may
work at a deeper systemic level, modifying system design
specifications or introducing alien components. One critical
avenue of a supply chain attack is defined by the ability to
alter the system itself, its components and their functionality,
including the addition or suppression of particular functions.
This relatively undefined form for supply chain attacks poses
a significant challenge for modeling and calls for a shift in
perspective.
In the face of these difficulties applying attack tree tech-
niques, we find that a model for supply chain attacks should
be component-centered rather than event-centered. With a
component-centered model it is possible to identify the
suppliers that are the source of the risk under investigation,
without artificially limiting the scope of their activity to some
set of events that a supplier may cause. With components
and suppliers as core elements, a risk model will consider
the probabilities of security failures that propagate through a
system. This kind of model will bear a close resemblance to
classical system reliability analysis, augmented with appro-
priate nodes for suppliers [14], [15].
The most difficult aspect of constructing such a model
for an existing system is ascertaining how component nodes
are related with respect to security attributes. This process
differs from classical fault tree analysis in an important
way. To construct a fault tree, it is possible to begin with
detailed understanding of the component functionalities and
interfaces. Although this is a complex task for a system
of any moderate size, in principle the information about
proper functional constraints is available. In contrast, security
failures may include the emergence of unknown faults that
originate from undefined behavior, software bugs, and over-
looked interface gaps. These issues are difficult to foresee
and information about them is largely reliant on processes of
empirical research. As such it may be difficult to ascertain
how the security of one component affects the security of
another.
When seeking to develop and apply such a model for an
existing system, the possibility of errors is a constraint within
which model development must occur. In some cases the
chief concern will be to develop more reliable estimations
of the trustworthiness of the suppliers in a system. In other
cases, though, the principal challenge in producing a reliable
risk assessment will involve ascertaining the proper structure
for the system in question, i.e., how the security attributes
of components are causally inter-related. After outlining the
necessary elements of a system model suited for supply chain
risk assessment, we then investigate the effects caused by
these various kinds of uncertainties.
A. System Graph
The model presented here is based on a directed graph
consisting of components and suppliers. After defining es-
sential parts of this system graph, we then describe how to
calculate systemic risk given such a graph.
1) Components: The components in a system will be
denoted as the set, C. The set is initialized with a component
that represents the system itself. A key feature of this
analysis is to consider each component as simultaneously
a component and a system in itself. The set, C, can be
expanded by conducting a recursive decomposition of each
element in the set, until an arbitrary level of depth is reached.
The termination condition for this recursive decomposition
process can be adjusted to provide more accurate analysis at
the expense of greater complexity. A general rule that defines
the maximal complexity that will be useful is to terminate
recursive decomposition when additional iterations will no
longer yield new suppliers. In other words, a component can
be considered a useful unit of analysis when it is produced
entirely or for the most part by a single supplier. When this
rule has been followed, the assumption is warranted that the
supplier of any component in the system bears full responsi-
bility for the component and cannot pass responsibility to one
of its own suppliers. This maximal complexity still entails
extensive decomposition that may yield diminishing returns
as components become simpler and their suppliers possess
less latitude to introduce security risk. As such, the degree
of depth is considered a hyper-parameter for the construction
of this model.
2) Suppliers: Each component in the system must be
assigned a supplier from the set, S, where s is the supplier of
c. To be the supplier of a component will be a general term
for the entity that is responsible for the manufacturing of
a component. While other roles may be considered relevant
to supply chain risk, such as maintenance or logistics, we
consider here a generalized supplier role that may be taken
to represent all aspects of supply chain risk. A rule for
designating a supplier will be that a supplier must have un-
restricted physical access to the component. While it may be
very desirable to implement transparency and accountability
schemes for suppliers, we assume here that the supplier is
able to act covertly if and when it desires.
3) Dependencies: Edges in this graph, E, will be of
two sorts: i) e ∈ C × C and ii) e ∈ S × C. Edges
between components will be added when the security of the
destination node requires the security of the source node.
Security of a component is defined by a security policy,
and may refer to any combination of attributes such as
{confidentiality, availability, integrity}.
Edges from suppliers to components are added when the
supplier is the supplier of the component in question. Here it
is assumed that the supplier is de facto a security dependency
of the component, such that if the supplier were compromised
or malicious, the component could no longer be considered
secure.
4) Node Logic: Similar to attack tree models, nodes in
the system graph here will each possess a logic function
` ∈ {AND,OR}. Input to ` will be the set of component
predecessors in the system graph, denoted as N−n ∩ C, or
the components that are security dependencies of the node
in question. The relationship of the node to its predecessors
will be dependent on `. The function L assigns a component
ci a particular function `.
5) Probability Values: Nodes in the system graph are
assigned probability values, r, that correspond to the like-
lihood of a security failure at the node. These risk values
Fig. 2: The conditions for node security failure involve local
failures of components, failures of component dependencies,
or a supplier failure.
for components are anterior to any consideration of prede-
cessors or suppliers, and are intended to capture the inherent
possibility of a component or supplier being compromised
directly. For example, a particular router may use vulnerable
software and as such possess a higher risk of security failure.
However as noted above, the compromise of predecessors or
the component’s supplier are taken to have the equivalent
effect of node security failure. In the example of the router,
compromising the router’s supplier would be as much of
a security failure as a classic exploitation of its vulnerable
software.
6) System Graph: With the above definitions in mind, a
system graph is defined as a directed graph G = (V,E, L, r)
where V = C ∪ S. A concise example is shown in Figure
1. Here three component nodes are related by edges between
them and each component also possesses a supplier node.
B. Risk Analysis
Systemic risk analysis is conducted on the system graph
by considering the likelihood of security failures at each node
and calculating the risk to the system as a whole. Drawing
on Leveson’s discussion of safety in [16], security can be
considered as an emergent property in a complex system
and so provision must be made to identify indicators of this
property. If the system graph is a tree, the root node is an
illustrative choice for an indicator. However, the system graph
may not have a root node, so it will always be necessary
to specify these indicators. Here we use In as the set of
indicator nodes whose security is critical to the system, and
`I is a logic function used to aggregate the function state
of the indicator nodes. System security is then defined as
`I(In).
1) Node Failure Conditions: There are three ways any
component node cn can fail:
• a direct, local security failure at the node itself, with
probability rn,
• a failure of its dependencies, `(N−n ),
• a failure of its supplier, sj with probability rj .
These three possible failure conditions are depicted in
Figure 2, with the node Mc representing the root of a sub-
tree indicating the possible failure modes of component c.
By substituting this module for each component node in
the system graph, a complete mapping of each possible
route to system security failure is possible. The root of
the module will be a node with ` = OR and r = 0,
with three predecessors: a component node with r = rn,
a supplier node with r = rj , and a predecessor node with
` = L(n) and r = 0. The predecessor node will receive the
incoming component edges that the original component node
possessed. If the original node had no predecessors, then the
predecessor node receives no incoming edges.
2) General System Risk Calculation: Given the above
system graph, the systemic security risk may be approached
with methods taken from reliability analysis. By distilling a
system graph into a set of minimal cutsets, the general risk
in a system is equivalent to the probability that all of the
cutsets are false [14]. Here we have relied on the MOCUS
algorithm to obtain minimal cutsets on a tree with AND/OR
logic [17], while pointing to ongoing research in this area for
algorithmic improvements [18]–[20]. If the minimal cutsets
are W , and ~r holds the probabilities of each node’s failure,
then the general risk is computed as:
R(~r) = 1−
∏
w∈W
(
1−
∏
v∈w
rv
)
. (1)
3) System Cutset Metrics: In addition to general system
risk, we note here several other metrics on a system graph
that will be useful in the analysis that follows. First, we note
the number of minimal cutsets, or |W |, which serves not as a
predictor of risk but is correlated with the complexity of the
system graph. While a risky system may have few cutsets that
contain relatively high probability events, in such a system
there are fewer variables to analyze. This factor may play a
role in assessing the confidence that users may reasonably
place in the utility of the results of risk analysis on such a
system.
A second, related metric is the average size of the cutsets:
W¯ =
∑
w∈W |w|
|W | (2)
Where W¯ is low, fewer events must occur for system failure.
While, again, this cannot be predictive of risk in general
without referring to the likelihood of the events in question,
the metric indicates the complexity of the system.
Lastly, we define the Jaccard distance of the cutsets W
and W ′ to be:
J(W,W ′) = 1− |W ∩W
′|
|W ∪W ′| (3)
As a measure of set similarity, the Jaccard distance will
be useful in comparing two systems. Where the distance is
very low, the two systems have very similar security failure
conditions. Analysis and mitigation, then, of one such system
will be transferable to the other with relatively high utility.
Although additions to this system model expand the
model’s ability to analyze risks in multi-layer networks with
suppliers possessing dependencies among themselves that
introduce further complexity, we present here a sufficiently
developed explanation to evaluate the performance of the
model under various realistic uncertainties.
III. UNCERTAINTIES IN MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Although the model we have developed bears a resem-
blance to established methods of system reliability analysis,
the problem domains of reliability and security differ suf-
ficiently to warrant a discussion of limits and challenges
to the use of this model in practice. While certain of
these challenges may be overcome through developments in
methodology, others may point to limits within which the
problem of supply chain security analysis must be conducted.
In the analysis that follows we identify major challenges to
the accurate construction of this model for a real system.
After discussing these challenges in general, we illustrate the
effect of four kinds of uncertainties using a case study.
A. Parametric Uncertainties in Probability Estimates
The first major area of difficulty in the use of such a model
is obtaining accurate probability estimates for basic events
such as component security failures and, more critically,
supplier security failures. Estimating the likelihood of a
supplier being compromised or being covertly malicious is a
problem involving considerable difficulty. On the assumption
that any compromise or malicious act will eventually be
detected and attributed accurately, the accuracy of risk values
will generally increase as this information is incorporated into
assessed likelihoods. We consider the problem of estimating
accurate risk values to be best approached through the
development and use of heuristics and metrics together with
information gathering and regular assessments. If accuracy is
a limitation here then it is one that system design and use
must accommodate.
B. Structural Modeling Uncertainties
A second source of uncertainty lies in the possibility that
sources of risk are simply omitted from the system model,
i.e., that some set of nodes or edges that should be in
the system graph are not included. We call these structural
uncertainties, and define them as a modeling choice that has
some effect on the set of minimal cutsets. Therefore the three
kinds of uncertainties here will include those related to nodes,
edges, and node logic functions. Being uncertain about the
structure of a system could easily be a matter of neglect or
oversight, but may just as well be a result of a complexity
in system design that lies outside the reasonable purview of
those building the model. In the case of both an inaccurate
probability value and a structural modeling divergence, the
calculated systemic risk value does not correspond to the
real system risk. In the case studies that follow, we seek to
illustrate the observation that structural uncertainties pose a
significant challenge to accurate modeling and merit priority
over improvements in accurate probability estimations.
IV. UNCERTAINTY CASE STUDIES
In the case studies that follow, we first present a ground
truth scenario that is intended to represent an ideal system
graph constructed to model the system in question. Following
TABLE I: Minimal Cutsets for Case 0: Each cell contains
one minimal cutset such that a failure of every node in the
cutset entails a system security failure.
{a} {b} {c}
{g} {h} {i}
{p} {q} {t}
{u} {r,s} {d,e,f}
{d,f,l} {d,f,m} {d,e,n,o}
{d,e,n,x} {d,e,n,y} {d,l,n,o}
{d,l,n,x} {d,l,n,y} {d,m,n,o}
{d,m,n,x} {d,m,n,y} {e,f,j,k}
{f,j,k,l} {f,j,k,m} {d,e,o,v,w}
{d,e,v,w,x} {d,e,v,w,y} {d,l,o,v,w}
{d,l,v,w,x} {d,l,v,w,y} {d,m,o,v,w}
{d,m,v,w,x} {d,m,v,w,y} {e,j,k,n,o}
{e,j,k,n,x} {e,j,k,n,y} {j,k,l,n,o}
{j,k,l,n,x} {j,k,l,n,y} {j,k,m,n,o}
{j,k,m,n,x} {j,k,m,n,y} {e,j,k,o,v,w}
{e,j,k,v,w,x} {e,j,k,v,w,y} {j,k,l,o,v,w}
{j,k,l,v,w,x} {j,k,l,v,w,y} {j,k,m,o,v,w}
{j,k,m,v,w,x} {j,k,m,v,w,y}
TABLE II: Results for Case 0, Ground Truth
|W | 53
avg(|w|)∀w ∈W 4.018868
J(W,W ′) 0.0
Risk 0.403032
∆Risk 0
this, we discuss four kinds of uncertainties and illustrate
the possible effect of each by comparing the results of risk
analysis after each error with the ground truth scenario.
A. Case 0: Ground Truth
The system graph for this case study is shown in Fig-
ure 3. It possesses a tree structure with twenty-five nodes
and with roughly equal numbers of AND and OR nodes
distributed throughout the graph. We have chosen the tree
structure to provide the basis of these examples because of its
resemblance to classical fault trees. In practice the structure
could vary widely. However, for the purpose of this study
a tree structure seems likely to provide a suitable basis for
generalization.
The minimal cutsets of this system are shown in Table I.
Each cell contains a set of nodes identified by alphabet letter,
where the security failure of all nodes in the set represents a
security failure of the top node. To compute a risk value for
the system, we provide sample component risk values such
that each component has a risk of failure of 0.05. Essential
metrics for this system are found in Table II.
TABLE III: Results for Case 1, Logic Uncertainty in c
|W | 63
avg(|w|)∀w ∈W 4.238095
J(W,W ′) 0.366197
Risk 0.144027
∆Risk -0.259005
B. Case 1: Uncertainty of Single Node Logic
In this first uncertainty scenario, the logic type of a single
node will be modified to represent the misclassification of
a node with regard to its predecessors. A full treatment of
the case of a single logic error suggests investigating the
effect of this error on any given node in the graph. While this
would indeed yield a more thorough understanding, such a
generalized study would be of limited value without operating
on a generalized graph. In lieu of this theoretical exercise,
here we present the result of analysis when various nodes
in the case study are mistaken. We chose nodes c and b,
where the analysis will be conducted on the graph after
each node’s logic function `n ∈ {AND,OR} has been
substituted for the opposite type. Descriptively, this entails
an error in recognizing the way that components g, h, i and
their predecessors affect the security of component c, with an
analogous error for node b. While the ground truth scenario
includes a more risk-amplifying relationship, where any of
g, h, i can cause c to fail, the situation studied in Case 1 is
that the model designer considers c to fail when all of g, h, i
have failed. As such, we expect that this analysis will result
in an erroneously low risk assessment when node c has been
modified, while the opposite will be the case for node b.
Detailed results for Case 1 on node c are shown in Table
III, including a modest rise in the number of cutsets as well
as their average size. The Jaccard distance from the ground
truth is 0.366, indicating a probability of roughly 1/3 that
a cutset in either case is not shared between the two. Risk,
as expected, has dropped by 0.259. To contrast, we present
the results for changing node b in Table IV. This single
node logic error results in a significant Jaccard distance of
0.83, while raising systemic risk by 0.139. Finally, Figure
4 shows the effect of a logic error at each node in the
system. Because many nodes are leaf nodes possessing no
dependencies, the nature of the logic function at the node
is irrelevant to systemic risk. Similarly, we note a general
correlation between the magnitude of the change in risk and
the height of the node in question.
C. Case 2: Uncertainty of Node Omission
When constructing a model, it may easily occur that a com-
ponent is overlooked and omitted from the model. Especially
as complex systems involve many layers of components,
there will be some uncertainty concerning whether important
nodes have been omitted. To capture this uncertainty, we test
here the result of deleting a node from the system graph.
As in Case 1, much of the effect of such an error will
depend on the topography of the system graph as well as
the location of the node omitted. When omitting a node, we
consider it necessary to omit also the children of the node that
become disconnected from the graph as a result. This choice
reflects the likelihood that in overlooking a component, its
subcomponents or dependencies will also be overlooked. We
test here the omission of a mid-level node f and, separately,
a higher-level node c. Figure 5 shows the modified system
graph with node c omitted.
Detailed results are shown in Tables V for the omission of
node f and VI for the omission of node c, while a survey of
the resulting change in risk for each node’s omission is shown
in Figure 6. It is pertinent to note the lack of correlation
Fig. 3: System Graph for Case 0: Uncertainty scenarios will be examined with reference to this as the ground truth scenario.
System security is represented by the top node, and node failures that constitute minimal cutsets will cause a failure of the
top node.
Fig. 4: Case 1 Results: When node logic is subject to discrete
error, systemic risk values vary widely, but with a magnitude
related to node height.
between the Jaccard distance of the minimal cutsets and
the change in systemic risk. While omitting node f yields
a very significant distance between the cutsets (0.81), the
change in risk is minimal (0.004). By contrast, omitting node
c results in a smaller Jaccard distance (0.17) but a very large
decrease in risk (0.305). This volatility in modeling results
points toward the importance of component level analysis in
understanding supply chain risk. We also note the lack of
correlation here between the change in risk and the height
of the node in question. Omitting node c has a rather large
effect, whereas node b, with the same height, has a very small
effect.
D. Case 3: Uncertainty in Edge Placement
The scenario captured as uncertainty in the placement of a
single edge will be when a component node is successfully
Fig. 5: System Graph for Case 2, illustrating an erroneous
omission of the component at node c as well as its sub-
components.
TABLE IV: Results for Case 1, Logic Uncertainty in b
|W | 23
avg(|w|) ∀w ∈W 1.478261
J(W,W ′) 0.830769
Risk 0.542643
∆Risk 0.139611
identified but it is mistaken how the node is related to other
nodes in the system. As such, an edge error entails no change
in the number of connected nodes in the graph. There may be
a large number of possibilities that are plausible ways an edge
might be mistakenly placed. As such it will be difficult to
examine all the nodes as was done in the previous two cases.
TABLE V: Results for Case 2, Node Omission in f
|W | 17
avg(|w|)∀w ∈W 1.588235
J(W,W ′) 0.813559
Risk 0.407450
∆Risk 0.004418
TABLE VI: Results for Case 2, Node Omission in c
|W | 44
avg(|w|)∀w ∈W 4.613636
J(W,W ′) 0.169811
Risk 0.097911
∆Risk -0.305121
We present detailed results of two different edge errors. First,
we remove edge 〈d, b〉 and substitute it for the edge 〈d, e〉.
The results of this error are shown in Table VII. To contrast,
we also investigate the change of edge 〈h, c〉 to 〈h, g〉, the
results of which are shown in Table VIII
In the first examined edge modification we find a minimal
change in risk despite a large distance between the cutsets.
In contrast, a change in the edge 〈h, c〉 yields the identical
minimal cutsets, owing to the nature of the original parent
node’s logic.
TABLE VII: Results for Case 3, Edge 〈d, b〉 → 〈d, e〉
|W | 46
avg(|w|)∀w ∈W 2.913043
J(W,W ′) 0.875
Risk 0.409726
∆Risk 0.006694
E. Case 4: Uncertainty in Probability Values
After having explored the various kinds of structural un-
certainties and illustrated their potential effects in particular
cases, we examine here the contrasting effects of uncertain-
ties in the estimation of probability values. These probability
Fig. 6: Case 2 Results, showing the change in system risk
when a single node and the sub-tree rooted at the node
is omitted. The magnitude of change in risk is not strictly
correlated with node height.
TABLE VIII: Results for Case 3, Edge 〈h, c〉 → 〈h, g〉
|W | 53
avg(|w|) ∀w ∈W 4.018868
J(W,W ′) 0.0
Risk 0.403032
∆Risk 0.0
TABLE IX: Results for Case 4
e 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.50
Risk 0.409364 0.418751 0.434108 0.544767
∆Risk 0.006332 0.015719 0.031076 0.141735
values are critical points of data without which a model
cannot approximate the real risk in a system. Yet because
of the difficulty of obtaining these values with accuracy and
confidence, we examine the general effect of various margins
of error. When applying each margin of error, 0 < e ≤ 1,
the adjustment is made by adding eri to element i of vector
~r. With this adjusted vector, the general risk function is
calculated. Because this class of errors involves no change
to the number or identity of cutsets, we only compare the
resulting risk value to the ground truth scenario presented
above. In Table IX, we show the effect on risk analysis of
four margins of error, e: 2%, 5%, 10% and 50%. Figure 7
shows a range of errors and the resulting change in systemic
risk.
We note that errors are calculated with reference to the
ground truth scenario, where the probability of each event is
0.05. As such, the maximum error shown in Figure 7, 100%,
results in an adjusted probability of 0.10. Likewise, we apply
this margin of error to every node in system graph. While
more complex or drastic scenarios can be imagined, these
high error rates are sufficient to illustrate the relative impact
of uncertainties of different kinds.
Fig. 7: Case 4 Results, where the probabilities of all events
are adjusted by increasing margins of error. Elevated prob-
ability values entail a linear increase in risk, but only high
margins of error are comparable to many structural uncer-
tainties.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a modification of attack
tree modeling suited for the analysis of supply chain risks
with the primary intention of investigating the practical utility
of such a model when faced with inevitable difficulties in
obtaining accurate data describing complex ICT and IoT
critical infrastructure systems.
The preceding case studies have depicted various possible
error scenarios that may be encountered while applying this
modeling technique to an existing system. Using a particu-
lar system graph, we have illustrated these error scenarios
with the help of several examples. Although caution is
warranted when approaching a problem of this complexity
from particular case studies, we use the results shown here
to highlight the importance of structural errors in comparison
to errors in obtaining accurate probability estimates. If the
security of components and the trustworthiness of suppliers
can be estimated to within 50% accuracy, our results show
a maximum possible error in risk assessment of 14%. This
is a significant change in risk, but equal or far greater
discrepancies are found with a wide variety of discrete
structural errors. Mistaking a single node’s logic function,
if it is a systemically important node, may produce double
the change in assessed risk. Similar discrepancies are found
with single node omissions or mistaken edges. Generally,
the nodes with greater height in the system graph are more
conducive to yielding larger discrepancies in systemic risk.
From these observations certain principles in the practical
development of supply chain risk assessments may be sug-
gested. The following preferences summarize the conclusions
of this study.
• Structure over magnitude: Given the scarcity of re-
sources available to conduct risk assessments, and the
possible impact of errors of various kinds, we sug-
gest significant attention be given to accurate structural
modeling. While efforts to obtain accurate magnitudes
in risk and trust values are certainly important, the
development of accurate structural models for the ways
in which components relate to each other as security
dependencies should usually be prioritized.
• Height over depth: At higher levels of systemic analy-
sis, accuracy in structural modeling should take unam-
biguous priority. Structural errors in the critical window
of 2-3 hops from the top event have the potential to make
extraordinary differences in modeling results. Extensive
and accurate modeling of depth into a system may be
helpful, but it is less important than ensuring accuracy in
this critical window. The difficulty of obtaining accurate
modeling at lower levels is matched by a decrease in the
impact of possible errors. As such, less effort should
be expended on components at these lower levels of a
system.
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